How is it that the dog can be emblematic for human longing? Does it mean that animals share in mankind's intimations of a higher being or immortality? Or is the anthropomorphism more mundane, announcing the sentimentalization of the pet seen later in Victorian England?
Here, the animal undoubtedly represents neither the human trait that Enlightenment thinkers conventionally denied it (i.e., reason), nor does the dog represent the feature that the nineteenth century frequently claimed humans and animals shared (i.e., a baser instinct). The dog is not an animal in a fairy tale waiting to be retransfigured into a human being and thereby saved from a beast's existence. Nor is he a talking animal who has stepped out of a fable to depict human frailties. Instead the dog possesses a kind of spirituality, a sense of awe. His transfixed gaze suggests a bond with a transcendent world; perhaps his chest breathes in oneness with nature. Even in the sparseness of the silhouette (or perhaps because of the evocative sublimity of its shorthand), Runge points to the mysterious interconnectedness of nature. All of nature is sacred and alive, a unity in which the dog participates.
I should like to argue that this particular substitution of animal for human occurs not insignificantly in Romanticism, and that Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg) was a major thinker in realigning the relationship between the two worlds. Of course, much scholarship has been devoted to nature, galvanism, and mineralogy in Novalis's writings.1 To be sure, there are fewer and less salient references to animals than to plants
The 18th-Century Debates on Animals
The arm of Descartes's judgment on the animal reached far into the Enlightenment. Descartes maintained that animals were natural automata, incapable of thought, language, understanding, and feeling. Although he did not deny them life or sensation, they were supposedly devoid of soul and immune to pain. Their bodies ran like clockwork. Predictably, significant challenges to Descartes's mechanistic view of animals and defenses of their rights were presented by such important philosophers as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Bentham, who in 1780 rephrased the seminal question as being not whether animals could reason or talk, but whether they could suffer. Yet Enlightenment thinkers repeatedly adhered to the stark Cartesian division of man from animal. Even when Leibniz claimed that they could not, as monads, be denied an eternal soul, Hume that they expressed dedication to each other and to humans, or Locke that they demonstrated some capacity to reason, still a fundamental separation and hierarchy dominated their classifications. Human reason defined the essential difference between species.2 According to Zedler, for instance, "theilet man die Thiere in verniinftige und unverniinftige, oder in Menschen und Vieh" (1334). Ironizing this recurrent eighteenth-century praise of man as animal rationale, Lichtenberg writes that if dogs, wasps, and hornets had been gifted with human reason, they would conquer the world (1:706, no.
360)!3
Underscoring the eighteenth-century faith in reason, Kant in the Metaphysik der Sitten repeatedly contrasts "Vernunft" and "moralisches Geffihl" to "Thierheit" (6:216, 387, 435).4 His use of the word "Thierheit" carries a double meaning: at times it refers to "andere Naturwesen" (6:400) and at times to part of man himself, out of which he must raise himself, as when Kant says, "Es ist [dem Menschen] Pflicht: sich aus der Rohigkeit seiner Natur, aus der Thierheit (quoad Fall 2003 actum), immer mehr zur Menschheit [...] empor zu arbeiten" (6:387), or when he contrasts "Thiermensch" to "Vernunftmensch" (6:435). Masturbation is euphemized as "Befriedigung thierischer Triebe" (6:425), "thierische Neigung" (6:425), or "bloBe thierische Lust" (6:424). Yet far from conceptualizing likeness between the species, Kant's use of such turns of phrase reinforces the differences between man and the lowly beast. According to Kant, animals don't have "eine Wiirde (einen absoluten inneren Wert)" (6: 435), whereas man is above possessing economic value. When Kant opposed cruelty to animals it was on the grounds that man has a duty to himself (not the animal!), for his sense of morality or of his obligations toward other humans could be diminished and eventually exterminated (6:444).5
Thus, although Kant cannot be seen as an advocate of animals' rights, Kant was nevertheless concerned for their welfare.6 In addition, he believed that domesticated animals should not be overworked and that, once they were too old to carry out their function, should be treated with gratitude and affection. Killing for sport was wrong (27:460). When necessary for human consumption, animals should be slaughtered as quickly and painlessly as possible (6:443, 27:459-60). Kant similarly abhorred vivisection when it was performed out of speculation, tortured the animals, or when its goals could be obtained by other means (6:443 In seeming contrast to Kant's Cartesian separation of man from beast, Herder begins Uber den Ursrpung der Sprache with the striking line "Schon als Tier, hat der Mensch Sprache" (697). This original language is one of "Empfindung, die unmittelbares Naturgesetz ist" (698) and one that man shared with animals. Herder, by opening his treatise with a discussion of pain and its expression, whether it be in human or nonhuman beings, is far from Descartes's mechanistic view of animals and his denial that they experience suffering. But unlike Novalis, who will later envisage a return to an Edenic language common to man and nature, Herder demarcates man's progression away from an instinctual language: what ultimately distinguishes man is his "Besonnenheit" (722) and capacity for reflection, "daB er erkenne, wolle, und wiirke" (719).
Because the eighteenth-century debate on man's relation to the brutes is so extensive, it is important to cite some of the more prominent contributors, especially those who strongly opposed Descartes, in order better to situate Novalis's departure from even these defenders of animals.8 Georg Friedrich Meier and Hermann Samuel Reimarus were the strongest German apologists. Writing in 1749, Meier ascribed not only the same sensory perceptions to animals as to man but granted them imagination, memory, wit, intelligence, judgment, language, pleasure, and displeasure (45-46). They were capable of love, and their souls lived into eternity, for God cannot destroy anything (48-50). Meier even compares all animals to children who die before they can make use of reason (117). Indeed, through death animals grow in understanding and reason and become "Geister"(118).
By the early 1760s, Reimarus was arguing that the diversity, order, and hierarchy among animals were proof of divine wisdom and providence. He observed purposiveness and perfection in animal nature, and ascribed to the brutes, as did Meier, a degree of imagination, memory, and even what he termed "Kunst-Triebe."9 Indeed, the Alige-meine Betrachtungen iiber die Triebe der Thiere (1760) concludes with the prescription that the animal instinct for art should serve as an impetus to man to become more educated!'" Reimarus did not deny animals souls, and claimed they shared with man the capacity for happiness. They could, moreover, be happier than man once their appetites are satiated and because they do not worry about the future. However, it is man's ability to compare past and present and thereby to extrapolate the future that sets him apart from the beast and allows him to strive for betterment. The historical gap separating Kepler's and Novalis's times is also invoked by the merchants in Heinrich von Ofterdingen. They speak of earlier times when nature was more alive and meaningful "lebendiger und sinnvoller" (1: 256), when the power of poetry was so in tune with nature that wild animals could be tamed and even stones could be drawn into dance-like movement (1: 257). Here Novalis bears comparison to a strain of Enlightenment thought, found in Rousseau and Herder, that man was no longer close to nature and had lost a sense for the uncomplicated, instinctual truth and confidence that animals display. Rousseau, for instance, saw perfectibility not as an advantage but as the source of frustration and unhappiness in man; beasts were healthier and happier (1:90). Yet, unlike the Enlightenment detractors of civilized man, Novalis does not set out to rob man of his self-importance. He thus can be distinguished yet further from the eighteenth-century rejection of the Cartesian man-beast distinction: it is not his aim to satirize church dogma or narrowminded moral philosophy on the superiority of man--a critique one finds additionally in Voltaire, La Mettrie (who mockingly spoke of "l'homme machine") or d'Holbach (who, disgusted with man's vanity, saw the soul as materialistic). Indeed, the passage cited above on the current mechanistic view of mankind would seem to be directed precisely against the influence of the likes of La Mettrie and d'Holbach. Novalis's impetus is even further removed from the intent to degrade man by unflattering comparison to the beast (La Mettrie, for instance, notoriously stated that man, like other creatures, came from clay). Instead the Romantic writer seeks to elevate nature (and man with her) by divining in her a vitalism or spirit that responds to a human lack.
However conventional it would be to state that vitalism replaces mechanism, dynamism classification as the operative mode in Romantic thinking, it is important to stress that this shift also applies to the relation between animals and humans. Intimation of the connectedness of beings replaces Enlightenment systemization, with the result that one can sense nature or the exterior world "als ein menschliches Wesen" (2:670). Whereas Kant feared that man might give in to animalistic drives, to the "Thiermensch" in him, Novalis celebrates the return to inclination and feeling, which is not separated from perception and intellect, all words that resonate with his use of the term "Sinne": "[W]ir genieBen die Natur mit vollen Sinnen, well sie uns nicht von Sinnen bringt" (1:213). In a late fragment he writes: "Unsere Sinne sind hdhere Thiere -Aus Ihnen entsteht ein noch hdherer Animalism" (2:825). Given that acute sensorial perception characterizes many animals, Novalis ventures to equate our senses with the animal and thereby to elevate their role. In this inspired alignment, he transforms both the realm of the human senses and what he calls "Animalism," a word I take to refer both to a heightening of the senses as well as an intensified connection to the animal world.
When Novalis conjoins man and animal in a fragment, it is frequently to imagine their interchangeability, to demonstrate the human potential for the fullness of animal life, rather than the descent into beastliness. When Novalis does seem to place humans on a higher plane of development from animals, the distinction is based on a relative, generative scale: for instance, after stating "Alles Leben ist ein iberschwdinglicher ErneuerungsproceB" (2:345), he says that animals have a doubled life, whereas man has a tripled one ("ein dreyfaches Leben") (2:346). Novalis is still far from anticipating a Darwinian notion of evolution; but he is also unlike his contemporary Lamarck, who is often referred to as heralding Darwin for his theory of mutable species. Whereas Lamarck upheld the doctrine of a scale of beings--the infinitely graded series of life from lowest to highest-Novalis envisaged manipulating to the point ofjettisoning the species categorization. Although Lamarck, like Novalis, subscribed to the belief that life arose from collected energies of a vital fluid, Novalis's utilization of such theories comes to very different conclusions. Novalis was not content with letting the presence of a universal life force stand as grounds for mere analogies between plant and animal; it allowed him to envisage the total exchange of plant for animal, animal for human, etc. This difference emphasizes that the transmutations Novalis postulates do not occur as pro- If nature's language is not always so familiar, then as Heinrich von Ofterdingen suggests, reading her will be an unending process: "Ewig wird er lesen und sich nicht satt lesen und tiiglich neue Bedeutungen, neue entziickendere Offenbarungen der liebenden Natur gewahr werden" (1:377). Clearly, if nature speaks, then she must be interpreted. At times, Novalis refers to the enigmatic, hieroglyphic language of nature that, as the Lehrlinge so beautifully puts it, can be discerned in eggshells, clouds, and snow but that can't be decoded (1:201). One of the Sais apprentices says that man improvises ("fantasiren") on nature as on an instrument, yet he cannot understand her (1: 222). Novalis urges comprehension when he observes that the aim of stones, trees and animals talking is "um den Menschen sich selbst fiihlen, sich selbst besinnen zu machen" (2:360). If Novalis in his uncompleted novel planned to turn Heinrich into a tree, it was not insignificantly into a "klingenden Baum" (1:398-99): in his process of "Bildung" man must become not only a part of nature but a nature that speaks. In other words, Novalis sees the language of nature not as self-contained-the vocal but nonsignifying chatter that Hyacinth carries on with the animals and birds-but as purposive: it is a language that communicates to man, which is why it is so important for Novalis that it be understood.
Not only does nature utter a language ideally comprehensible to man, but man also intimately addresses nature. Her capacity for listening serves as a model to humans. Rescuing him from the ocean is a sea creature, whom Novalis evocatively names an "Unthier," who receives as thanks for his mission another air. And when the poet sings about the loss of his jewels, the creature returns them. Song is thus a form of communication understood and appreciated by animals. Perhaps the dolphin-like beast, in his capacity for gratitude and response to human need, is unjustly categorized as an animal, and thus called an "Unthier." Or, the designation "Unthier" could mark the animal par excellence-that which must be cast out of the human category; it is abject and monstrous (interchangeable with "Ungeheuer"). Like the singer himself, the animal is unfairly excluded from human society.
Novalis transforms the radically Other into a familiar being through the Orphic address across the human to other forms ofnature: "Wird nicht der Fels ein eigenthiimliches Du, eben wenn ich ihn anrede?" And by continuing "Und was bin ich anders, als der Strom?" (1:224), he reverses the transformation by becoming the Other himself. Alluding to Novalis's exchange of the Fichtean "NichtIch" to a "Du," Dennis Mahoney characterizes this reciprocity as an "I-Thou" relationship, and, in reference to the fairy tale of Hyacinth and Rosebud, states that nature's language can be unveiled "because human beings are themselves part of nature" (7). I would agree, though want to stress that Novalis envisages a radical metamorphosis into the consciousness of organic and inorganic nature. Although mankind is part of nature, nature is respected for its status as sheer otherness, something man can only begin to fathom by taking leave of his own limitations.
In an earlier article on self-reflexivity in Novalis, I noted how he pries open Fichtean ego philosophy to characterize the return to the self as an eccentric path that entails leaving the self ("Reassessing Romantic Reflexivity"). Hardenberg's notion of "sich selbst Uberspringen" (2:345, no. 134) and travelling "zu sich selbst wieder heraus" (2:244, no. 43) calls for a form of self-alienation, what he terms "Selbstfremdmachung-Selbstverdnderung--Selbstbeobachtung" (2:670).21 This exercise in self-negation not only has far-reaching implications for how one assesses Idealist philosophy and "Bildung.'"22 It also impacts what we would call today an ecologically minded respect for nature's uniqueness and, particularly, for how we treat animals as separate yet integral beings unto themselves. In other words, we find in Novalis an intense desire to comprehend the diverse languages of nature combined with a keen consciousness of the inaccessibility of these languages if man does not try to escape the confines of his familiar, anthrocentric worldview.
Once creation can be valued independently of human interests and animals treated as ends in themselves (which Novalis's views imply), then the next step would be to grant animals freedom from human utilization (say, as food sources or for medical experimentation). Novalis does not address an- der irdischen Natur verwebt" (1:337). The passage indicates that a higher world is now present and visible in nature, but we don't realize it. Or, to slightly vary the predicament, perhaps it is our inability to articulate the communion we do sense. Thus earlier Heinrich says: "daB man gerade wenn man am innigsten mit der Natur vertraut ist am wenigsten von ihr sagen k6nnte und m6ch-te" (1:328). Here the union with nature is ineffable, but Jean Paul suggests it is actually our own linguistic deficiency that makes it so: "Sprache. Aus der Unmdglichkeit, die Thierstimme in Worte zu bringen, seh' ich die Armuth an Buchstaben" (173, no. 355).
What then does the language of animals resemble, if one were to try to characterize it? To begin, it is marked by its untranslatability: as for Walter Benjamin, such a poetic language would be defined by our not being able to translate it into ordinary discourse. Instead, intuition would be key to making it signify. If in the "Monolog," Novalis identifies language as pure articulation and a structure of differentiation with its own inner coherence, then perhaps, too, the language of animals would be sheer utterance. Indeed, it would be rhythmic and harmonious, similar to music or the plastic arts. 
